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1. Introduction
This paper attempts to summarize the effects of offering compensa-
tion to respondents on consumer expend' ture surveys based on the results
of a number of observational and experimental studies of this question
undertaken by the University of Illinois and other institutions. It ad-
dresses itself to the evaluation of two effects on such surveys --coopera-
tion and report validity. Cooperation we define here as equivalent to
the response rate, that is, the proportion of sample households contacted
that grant the desired interview (s)
.
Another aspect of cooperation, inducing those being interviewed to
provide more complete or more accurate information, is subsumed under our
second major heading, report validity. It is defined as the expenditures
(in units or amounts, as the case may be) reported by the cooperating house-
hold in relation to the true, unknown expenditure. In the absence of vali-
dating information in most of these studies, it is not possible to separate
this factor into its two components of more complete information and greater
accuracy of information that is reported. Indeed, all that can be assumed,
as will be shown later, is that under the circumstances in which the studies
were carried out, more expenditures means greater reporting accuracy, with
the partitioning of this factor between completeness and accuracy left
to later, more comprehensive studies.
We begin by considering, in the next section, the rationale for of-
fering compensation in consumer expenditure surveys, some of the types of
compensation that can be (and have been) offered, and what effects a_
priori reasoning leads us to expect from such offers. Though any such
inferences are bound to be colored by our ex post knowledge of the results
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of these past studies, such reasoning should nevertheless serve a useful
purpose by providing a more rigorous framework for evaluating the meaning
and significance of the empirical studies.
Section 3 reviews evidence from empirical studies of the effect of
compensation on cooperation, while Section 4 considers what information
these studies provide on report validity. The final section brings together
the results of the preceding r.wo sections and, with these results as a
basis, attempts to draw some generalizations regarding the types of con-
ditions under which compensation would seem desirable as well as questions
on this topic that would constitute the basis for further research.
Before beginning, it is important to distinguish among different
methods of collecting expenditure information, since compensation procedures
and effects can vary substantially by these methods. For these purposes,
three such methods can be distinguished. One method is to collect this
information by a one-time interview with the household, as was done in the
1960-61 and 1950 Consumer Expenditure Surveys of the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The interview in such a case can be quite long, at times up
to eight hours (which may be divided into two or three sittings) , and in-
volves recall of expenditures for periods varying from one week to a year
depending on the type of expenditure.
A second method entails the information of panels of households who
are asked to report expenditures periodically by direct interview, either
a face-to-face interview or by telephone. The recall is much shorter,
usually not exceeding three months, but involves much more cooperation on
the part of the household over time. This type of data collection method
has been utilized much more in other countries, such as in the surveys of
income and expenditures undertaken by the Latin American group of research
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institutes coordinated by the Brookings Institution, (1) and in various
experimental studies to be reported shortly.
The third method of data collection also involves panels of house-
holds but with expenditures recorded in written diaries rather than reported
orally. These diaries usually cover short periods of time, usually not
more than a week or two but sometimes as long as a month. The use of these
diaries tends to provide far more detail on expenditures than can be ob-
tained otherwise and, at least theoretically, enables the respondent to re-
cord the expenditures immediately after they have taken place and, hence,
presumably with the greatest completeness and accuracy. In the United
States these diaries have been used primarily for supplementary data col-
lection, mainly for food and related expenditures, though they are being
used much more heavily in the current survey of consumer expenditures being
conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Census for the BLS.
2. Why Compensate?
The general attitude in the past has been that compensation was not
needed on expenditure surveys undertaken by governmental agencies, for
two reasons. Since the data were being sought by a governmental agency,
it was felt that people would not expect to be paid and that they would
consider their cooperation as a public service. Second, there was the
further feeling that when such data were sought by a personal interview,
even though considerable memory effort might be required, the respondent
would still receive psychic rewards from the social interaction with the
interviewer in which he (or she) is the dominant figure. It seems to have
been essentially for these reasons that for many years in the United States
no compensation was offered on expenditure studies by government agencies,
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al though marketing research firms seeking much the same information did
offer compensation, and are still doing so.
The shift toward the greater use of diaries and written records on
expenditure surveys, brought about by the large body of evidence on the
substantial errors that exist in expenditure data obtained by recall, has
served to place increasing attention on possibly offering some form of
compensation. Rising wage levels, increasing labor force participation by
women, and a tendency to involve family members other than the housewife
in these interviews have all served to accentuate this trend. In effect,
the rationale is that record-keeping and other forms of writing are in-
herently distasteful to most people, and they have to be encouraged to do
so by means of special incentives.
While marketing research firms have been using various methods of com-
pensation for a number of years, their use in expenditure surveys by govern-
mental agencies has only recently been considered, and some experiments
evolving from this consideration are discussed in the later sections of
this paper. Thus it is not surprising that most survey organizations do
not compensate respondents for one-time interviews while diary-keepers
are usually compensated either in cash or with gifts. For panels where
households report periodically to interviewers , there is some tendency to
compensate on some of the interviews, especially if the interview is long
and complex, and if the panel will be used for more than a year.
One other issue, for which we have only limited field information,
is whether the need for compensation is related to the type of survey or-
ganization. Thus, some researchers argue on ethical grounds that when
expenditure information is collected for commercial purposes by a profit-
making organization the respondent should be compensated, while if the
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information is collected by a governmental or other non-profit survey or-
ganization compensation is not required.
Compensation can take many forms. The most obvious form is a cash
payment for granting the interview. s has been used by some commercial
firms but has been used very little by governmental agencies, since the
amount of cash that can be offered is usually not considered enough to
influence the respondent to cooperate if he is otherwise inclined. There
are some exceptions, however, where cash seems to be more convenient. Thus,
where record-keeping is not required but long-term cooperation is necessary,
the A.C. Nielsen Television Panel rewards the household with fifty cents
when the cartridge is removed from the television set for mailing.
Merchandise gifts take many forms. Most pertinent, perhaps, is the
distinction between gifts given outright in exchange for a single interview
and gifts given over a period of time in exchange for cooperation in a
panel. The MRCA National Consumer Panel rewards households with gifts of
their choice from an attractive catalog similar to the one used by trading
stamp companies. The advantage of gifts rather than cash is that gifts
may sometimes be purchased at reduced prices by the researchers, so that
the value to the respondent is greater chan the outlay to the survey or-
ganization. In addition, gifts act as a continuing reminder each time
they are used or observed.
A combination approach may also be used, such as offering one gift
to a household on the first interview to induce them to begin to cooperate
and to offer something else toward the completion of their service on the
panel. Needless to say, numerous alternatives are possible, and as of
this writing very little information is available on the relative effec-
tiveness of these different alternatives.
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The focus of this paper is on the effects of compensation on cooper-
ation and report validity relative to expenditure surveys conducted by non-
profit or governmental agencies . To the extent that compensation has any
effect in these instances, we would expect that merchandise offerings would
have more effect than the offer of an equivalent cash amount, that merchan-
dise of a less commercial nature would be more effective than other types
of merchandise, and that in the case of a panel study several gifts spread
over time would be more effective than the same gift offered at one point
in time. We would also expect for economic reasons that the effects would
be more pronounced on lower income and poorly educated families. Although
none of the studies to be reported in the remainder of this paper were de-
signed specifically with these individual hypotheses in mind, it is of
interest nevertheless to examine the extent to which these hypotheses are
supported by the data.
3. Effect on Cooperation
Seven experiments or studies of the effect of compensation on cooper-
ation are reviewed in this section. Only one of these relates to a one-time
interview. Of the other six, two were panel studies seeking data by per-
sonal interview and four were panel studies using the diary approach.
a. One-time interviews
There is little evidence on the effects of compensation for single
face-to-face interviews, although there is substantial evidence that com-
pensation improves cooperation on mail questionnaires. (2, pp. 94-100.)
In the one personal interview experiment that has come to our attention,
on obtaining reports of savings accounts conducted by the Survey Research
Center in 1959, the cooperation rate was 67 percent among those offered
no compensation arid was much less, 52 percent, when respondents were
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offered ten dollars. (6) This drop, however, may have been due to suspicion
on the part of respondents of the purposes of the study and also to mis-
understandings about the method by interviewers, as noted by the authors. (6,p. 127)
Although isolated instances have been encountered of people refusing to
cooperate with a university study if offered remuneration- -the boomerang
effect ("What business has a university doing in giving people money when
they're always asking for money. ..?") --it is hard to imagine such a phenom-
enon taking place on a wide scale.
b. Panel personal interviews
A noncontrolled test of the effect of compensation on households in-
terviewed periodically was also carried out as part of the Consumer Savings
Project during the course of a panel study of saving behavior in Chicago in
1957-58.(4) At the interviewer's discretion, an initial gift of merchan-
dise or a magazine subscription which cost the project between $2.50 and
$4.50 was offered to the respondent. Circumstantial evidence based on in- .'
terviewer evaluations indicated that:
An advance offer of a gift helped secure cooperation in
about one-fifth of the background interviews. The gift was
felt to be particularly effective among lower income groups,
whereas when higher income people were offered gifts, the
interviewer was often rebuked for doing so.
Of those offered gifts about nine out of ten accepted.
Though it is not clear whether the acceptance of a gift was
cause or effect, those who accepted gifts were generally much
more cooperative than those who did not, particularly in their
willingness to supply all the data requested. Those who were
not offered gifts also withheld data more frequently than the
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average, though it is not clear whether offer of a gift
might have improved matters.
A pronounced improvement in rapport was obtained on
the fourth wave of the panel operation when a newspaper
story on the project was sent to panel members with the
advance letter and just after all panel members had been
sent a surprise gift of a box of assorted cheeses. (4,pp. 26-29)
While this evidence is by no means as conclusive as that from a con-
trolled experiment, the fact remains that all indications pointed to a
positive effect of compensation on cooperation, as well as on report va-
lidity. On the other hand, a very different experience is reported by
Dohrenwend in offering compensation in a small two-wave study in Manhattan
seeking information on urban living styles. (3) On the first wave, half
the respondents were offered five dollars compensation while half were
not. On the second wave, those respondents who had received compensation
were offered an additional five dollars and half of the respondents who
had not received compensation on the first wave were offered five dollars
for cooperating on the second wave. There was no significant difference
in cooperation among the three procedures --65 percent of households who
were never compensated cooperated on both waves as compared to 61 percent
of respondents who were offered compensation on both waves and 53 percent
of respondents who were offered compensation for Wave 2 only. For Wave 1
only, the results were in the opposite direction, 56 percent of respondents
who were offered compensation cooperated compared to 50 percent of those
who were not compensated. Since the sample sizes for each of the two
groups in the first wave consisted of about 80 respondents and the sample
size in Wave 2 was also about 80, none of the differences is significant.
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The lack of effect of compensation may be due to the topic of the
study, which dealt with urban living and attitudes toward the community.
Unlike expenditure or savings surveys that may require substantial memory
effort or looking up records, most community attitude surveys are not dif-
ficult or threatening. It may also be due to the manner of administration;
the compensation offer was made by mail and referred to it as an "honorarium,"
a word that lower and middle income people would find hard to understand.
c. Panel diary studies
The four studies- reviewed under this heading were conducted by two
organizations, two by the Social Survey in England and two by the Survey
Research Laboratory (SRL) of the University of Illinois. The first two •
studies related to the United Kingdom and are reported by Kemsley and
Nicholson. (5) In one study, conducted in 1951 by the Social Survey,
households were asked to keep an expenditure record for one week. The
sample was divided randomly into three groups of about 500 each: the
first group received no compensation, the second group received five shil-
lings for cooperating and the third group received ten shillings. The
cooperation rate for contacted households was 52 percent for those receiving
no compensation, 62 percent for those receiving five shillings and 67 per-
cent for those receiving ten shilling
In the second study, a later and somewhat looser experiment, respon-
dents were offered 25 shillings to keep a diary for four weeks. Among con-
tacted households, 47 percent kept a diary for four weeks. Although there
was no control group in this survey, Kemsley and Nicholson speculated that
a higher cooperation rate could have been obtained had the compensation rate
been still higher, but to our knowledge there have been no additional
British experiments on compensation since their 1960 paper.
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The two experiments of SRL in obtaining consumer expenditures by
diary methods that involved compensation indicate that compensation in-
creased cooperation by ten to 15 percentage points for periods of two or
three weeks and by about 25 percentage points for four weeks. (7,9)
In the first experiment, conducted in 1969 in the Springfield and
Rock Island, Illinois, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, respon-
dents were randomly divided into four groups who received the following
treatments
:
1. No gift . This group did receive a plastic folder and ballpoint
pen both labeled "University of Illinois" for use in recordkeeping,
These items, which retailed for about $1.00, were not mentioned
as gifts but households were allowed to keep them.
2. Summary and comparison of purchases . A report of respondent
purchases by major categories and compared with the purchases of
other panel families with similar incomes.
3. Large stationery holder . A large padded stationery holder with
pen, retailing for about $5.00, to contain the diaries during
the recordkeeping period. Respondents were told the holder was
a gift for keeping the diary.
4. American flag, posters, or government publications . A choice
of an American flag with holder, posters of Illinois history
or one of 40 popular Government Printing Office publications,
again averaging about $5.00 in value. (It is interesting that
roughly two- thirds of this group chose the American flag.)
Within each of these groups, respondents were asked to keep diaries
for periods of one, two, three, and four weeks. Thus, all respondents
were asked to keep a diary for at least one week, three-quarters were
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asked to keep a diary for at least two weeks, half were asked to keep a
diary for at least three weeks, and one-fourth were asked to keep a diary
for four weeks.
The percent cooperating by week and by type of gift are given in
Table 1. Although the initial effect of some gift on agreement to keep
a diary is small, the differences in rate of cooperation are eight percen-
tage points for one week, 13 percentage points for two or three weeks and
about 25 percentage points for four weeks. Interestingly enough, the
nonmerchandise offer (of providing purchase comparisons) seems to have
been more effective than the other two, at least in terms of cooperation.
These results are confirmed by a more recent 1972 study by SRL in
the Chicago SMSA. (9) In this study respondents were asked to keep diaries
for two weeks, with a $5.00 check offered to a randomized half. The co-
operation rate for households who were compensated was 79 percent for
two weeks compared to a cooperation rate of 67 percent for those not com-
pensated, a percentage point difference of 12 percent. This same differ-
ence was obtained in comparing the data for the one week cooperation rate--
85 percent for compensated households and 73 percent for households not
compensated
.
This most recent experiment provides some data on the differential
effect of compensation by education and/or income level. In this study,
which covered the Chicago SMSA, significant differences were found between
the effects of compensation in the City of Chicago and in suburban areas.
In the suburbs, compensation had no effect on cooperation— 85% of contacted
households cooperated regardless of cooperation. In the City of Chicago,
85% of contacted households who received compensation cooperated, while
only 68% of those who received no compensation cooperated.
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Table 1. Percent Cooperating in Panel by Type of Gift
Extent of
Cooperation
Agreed to keep diary
Kept at least one
diary
No
gift
Type of Gift
Summary and Large
Some comparison stationery Flag or
gift of purchases holder book
85.7(113) 89.6(412) 88.3(128)
77.1(113) 84.7(412) 85.9(128)
92.0(125) 88.7(159)
90.4(125) 79.2(159)
Kept at least two
diaries 62.1(90) 75.1(297) 71.1(90) 82.6(101) 71.3(106)
Kept at least three
diaries
Kept four diaries
54.1(61) 67.0(198) 66.7(63)
23.1(30) 48.6(96) 54.8(31)
70.2(66) 64.3(69)
39.4(31) 51.4(34)
Note: Percentages in this table are the number of households keeping given
number of diaries as a percent of those asked to keep a diary for at least that
length of time, for that type of gift. The base figures, in parentheses, are
the number of households asked to keep a diary for at least that length of time,
Thus, the 90 keeping two diaries and who received no gift is the number of house-
holds asked to keep the diary for 2, 3, or 4 weeks.
Source: (7, p. 728)
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The obvious differences between city and suburban households are in
the two social class variables, income and education. Lower income city
households generally find record-keeping more difficult while at the same
time the compensation they get has greater marginal utility. Thus, com-
pensation helps to reduce the panel biases against low income households.
Panels generally get lower cooperation from very small households (1 or
2 members) and very high income households, but compensation seems to
have no effect on these biases.
Since low income households spend less, the mean expenditures with
these households included will be lower than if they are not in the panel.
These results are confunded, however, by the results of the next section
that indicate that compensation may influence the accuracy of reporting.
Auspices . What limited data are available indicate that compensation
has the same effects of increasing cooperation regardless of auspices.
In the 1972 study in the Chicago SMSA just discussed, (9) for half the
sample, the advance letter was on U.S. Bureau of the Census stationery and
signed by its Director. The diaries also had the Bureau of the Census
headings on them, and interviewers said that they were acting as collecting
agents for the Bureau of the Census. In the other half of the sample,
advance letters, diaries, and interviewers were all identified as from
the University of Illinois. In the City of Chicago, for University of
Illinois auspices, compensation increased the cooperation rate 14 percent-
age points from 75% to 89%, and for Census Bureau auspices, compensation
increased cooperation 17 percentage points, from 64% to 81%. Compensation
had no effect in the suburbs in either case.
All things considered, the evidence from these studies would seem
to support the hypothesized effects of compensation, at least as applied
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to cooperation. The evidence, though relatively sparse, strongly supports
the positive effects of compensation on cooperation in the case of diary
studies with the principal effects being in areas more heavily populated
with lower income and more poorly educated households. The evidence is
more mixed in the case of personal interview studies.
4. Effect on Validity
Little information is available on the effect of compensation on
report validity, partly no doubt because of the difficulty of obtaining
the necessary validating data. As a result, perhaps, some of the past
studies have not considered this question at all. Yet in many ways, this
is the key question, for one may argue that the ultimate objective of com-
pensation is not to raise response rates for their own sake, but as a means
of improving the validity of the resulting information.
In theory, there need be no relation between the cooperation effect
and the validity effect. Thus, if compensation brings about no increase
in response rate but a substantial improvement in the validity of the data
reported by those who do cooperate, the extra cost and effort could be
judged well worth it; whereas if the response rate were to rise markedly
but with no improvement in data quality, the use of compensation would
be highly questionable. It is therefore all the more unfortunate that so
few results are available on this aspect, and many of these are only cir-
cumstantial.
A priori one would expect compensation to improve report validity,
in the sense that the offer of compensation conveys to the respondent a
moral obligation to devote more effort or thought to providing the re-
quested information, whether from memory or by diary methods. However,
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on this basis it could be argued that the effect should be greater where
diary methods are used than recall by personal interview, because greater
effort is required to keep diaries, except if the respondent is being
asked to furnish data from records.
With these thoughts as a frame of reference, let us look at what
the data have to show. As will be seen, it is particularly difficult
to draw any firm conclusions in view of the very few studies and the lack
of validating information on expenditures. The absence of the latter is
expecially frustrating, for it means that data validity has to be inferred
indirectly. The criterion used in such cases is that "more means better."
In other words, more reports of expenditure and higher outlays per house-
hold are considered to reflect more valid data, on the premise that ex-
penditures are being reported that would otherwise be omitted. This has
some basis in the well-known tendency of household survey data to under-
state expenditure aggregates but does not make any allowance for tele-
scoping effects that can act in the opposite direction. Indications from
our data, however, are that the former effect is predominant. (8)
Four of the studies reported earlier contained some information re-
lating to validity effects, and those aspects of those studies are reviewed
here. In the one-time personal interview Survey Research Center study
reported by Lansing, Ginsburg and Braaten(6), no significant differences
in reporting of savings accounts were found between compensated and non-
compensated households, because of small sample sizes. Nevertheless, the
results reproduced from that study in Table 2 indicate a slightly higher
tendency for heads of households who were compensated to report ownership
of a savings account, and to report more accurately the balance, in the
account, if they were willing to state a balance, than non- compensated
heads.
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The personal interview savings panel (4) described on pp. 7-8 yielded
circumstantial evidence of improved data accompanying the offer of com-
pensation. Despite the lack of controls, the evidence was fairly strong
that among lower income households, offer of compensation increased their
willingness to report on their saving behavior both initially as well as
at a later stage in the panel. The findings of that study suggest that
the impact of compensation wears off over time and that a follow-up gift
is well worth considering.
The two SRL diary experiments in obtaining expenditure data yielded
mixed results on the effect of compensation on report validity. (7,9)
In the 1969 SRL study, households who received some gift reported higher
levels of expenditures than those who received no gift, as shown in Table
3. The differences increased each week, from nine percent the first week
to 18 percent the second week to about 60 percent in weeks three and four.
Over all four weeks, households receiving a gift reported 17 percent more
expenditures than did households who did not get a gift.
These results were not confirmed in the 1972 SRL study. (9) Control-
ling for city-suburban and diary-phone procedures, no significant differ-
ences were found in total expenditures, for food products only, or by
individual product class types.
We can only speculate why compensation affected reporting on the
earlier experiment but not on the later one. The earlier experiment
tested periods up to four weeks, and the greatest differences between
compensated and non- compensated households were found in the third and
fourth weeks. Thus, shortening the recordkeeping period reduces the ef-
fects of compensation on level of diary reporting. Still for the first
two weeks combined, there was more than a ten percent difference in
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Table 3; Reported Total Expenditures Per Household
By Type of Gift and Week*
Week No Gift Some Gift Summary and
comparison
of purchases
Large
stationery
holder
Flag
or
book
1 $124 C85) $135 (327) $141 C97) $136 C105) $129 (125)
2 107 (42) 126 (207) 122 (57) 113 (74) 142 (76)
3 89 (20) 142 (120) 144 (37) 140 C41) 141 (42)
4 61 C7) 96 (46) 96 (13) 76 (16) 115 (17)
Four week
average $112 C154) $131 (700) $133 (204) $126 (236) $133 (260)
Source: (7, p. 732)
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level of reported expenditures between compensated and non- compensated
households on the earlier experiment, as compared to no difference on the
later experiment. Aside from sampling errors, there may have been some
interviewer effects since the previous study stressed gifts as a major
variable, with three different gifts being tested, while in the 1972 study
the major variable was the use of telephones.
5. Nature of Compensation
Form . There is little evidence to indicate that the form of compen-
sation has any significant effect on cooperation or accuracy of reporting.
A wide variety of gifts as well as money have been used for compensation,
with no strong evidence of differential effects. This was illustrated in
Table 2 by the response rates for three different forms of compensation
given in the 1969 SRL diary experiment. (7) While the large stationery
holder obtained slightly higher cooperation rates than the other gifts
in the first three weeks, none of the differences were significant. In
the fourth week, these cooperation rates reversed and cooperation was
lowest for households who received the stationery holder.
Other non-experimental evidence also indicates no differences in
cooperation by type of compensation. The 1972 SRL experiment used money
for compensation, as did the British Survey reported by Kemsley and
Nicholson (5) . There were no substantial differences in cooperation
between these studies and the results in Table 1. Also, MRCA uses gifts
while Nielsen uses money and both panels have about the same level of
cooperation.
The results of Table 3 indicate that the form of the gift has no
effect on the level of reporting. For the four weeks, the average weekly
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expenditure did not vary by more than an insignificant five dollars from
the mean by type of gift. Obviously, it would be possible to bias expen-
diture data by gifts that influenced future purchase behavior. For this
reason, gifts are never chosen from the same expenditure categories as
are being measured. Thus, if one were measuring food consumption, one
would avoid gifts of food or related to food preparation.
Level and Frequency . If recordkeeping is considered onerous, one
would expect that cooperation would increase with increased compensation.
The relation is probably curvilinear, however. Respondents have a vague
idea what their efforts are worth, and payments far above this level
might well result in suspicion by respondents and anxiety among inter-
viewers that would reduce cooperation. Similarly, compensation much
below the expected level might be treated as no compensation. In the
range of reasonable compensation levels, the cooperation rate may be
fairly flat.
Tiie only published evidence we know of is the Kerns ley and Nicholson
study (5) discussed earlier which indicated that response increased from
62 to 67 percent as the compensation level increased from five to ten
shillings. When the time period was increased to four weeks, however,
increasing the compensation to 25 shillings still results in a lower co-
operation rate.
Nothing is published about the effects of level of compensation on
accuracy of recording expenditures. One suspects, however, that accuracy
is less sensitive to level of compensation than is cooperation, so that
changes in compensation that do not affect cooperation would not affect
recording levels.
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Perhaps more important than level of compensation is the frequency
of reinforcement in the case of panel studies covering periods longer
than one or two weeks. MRCA and Nielsen reward respondents each time a
diary or cartridge is mailed. The SRL results in Tables 1 and 3 suggest
that an additional gift in the fourth week might have increased cooper-
ation. The results of the 1957 savings panel experiment, discussed on
pp. 29-30, suggest strongly that follow-up gifts can have noticeable ef-
fects on respondent's cooperativeness, especially in a panel study ex-
tending over many months.
6. Summary and Implications
As must be evident from this sketchy review, the effects of compen-
sation on consumer expenditure or saving data have been the subject of
relatively few studies. Since this past work has been mostly in the
nature of case studies, any results cannot be considered definitive but
rather more in the nature of hypotheses for further investigation.
What does seem to emerge is that the effects of compensation in
such studies vary depending on whether the study is based on one-time
interviews or on a panel approach, and depending on whether or not the
sample members are asked to keep written records. For one-time interviews
with no written records, there is no evidence that compensation improves
the results either from the point of view of cooperation or report validity.
It should be stressed, however, that this inference is based on only two
studies one of which does not seem to have sought detailed expenditure
information.
In panel studies, whether by personal interview or by written record-
keeping, there are indications that some form of compensation will con-
tribute to a higher rate of response as well as to more complete and
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accurate information. To judge from the experiences reported from the
one personal interview panel covered in this paper, rapport with panel
members can be improved greatly by offering some form of compensation
after three or four interviews. Continuing interaction with the panel mem-
bers either in the form of compensation or by offering them reports on
earlier results or other types of information seems to improve willing-
ness to participate in the panel.
The effects of compensation are especially clear in obtaining higher
response for even short periods of time if sample members are requested
to keep written records of expenditures. In all three studies covered
in this paper, marked increases in the rate of response seem to have
occurred as a result of compensation. These increases were concentrated
mostly among families with lower incomes and less education. Despite
this clear effect on the rate of response, however, the apparent effects
on report validity are mixed. Whereas in soaie instances compensation ap-
parently induced higher report validity, in other instances it seemed
to have no effect. The best that can be said in the latter case is that
in such instances the initial cost of compensation seems to be offset by
reduced field costs brought about by the higher rate of response, so that
neither total cost nor cost per unit of information is affected adversely
by compensation.
One finding that runs counter to the hypotheses advanced on page
six is that form of compensation seems to have little effect on either
the rate of response or report validity. To be sure, no clearly commer-
cial offerings (such as a subscription to a popular magazine) were made
in any of these studies, but it does appear that for a wide range of re-
latively non-commercial possibilities the effect of compensation is not
likely to be influenced by the specific form used.
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In view of these findings and inferences, one may well ask from a
practical survey point of view when and under what conditions compensation
would seem advisable in studies of this type. In our opinion, there does
not seem to be much basis at the present time for offering compensation
on one-time interviews. There does, however, seem to be a clear rationale
for offering compensation on a panel study, whether or not information
is sought by written recordkeeping by the respondents, and whether or not
the study is being conducted by a governmental or non-profit agency. In
terms of cooperation the results are likely to be much better, while in
terms of report validity the results are likely to be at least as good
as if no compensation were offered. The cost analyses from the two SRL
diary studies indicate that the higher rates of response brought about
by the compensation serves to more than offset their costs, with the result
that the total cost of the survey and the cost per interview is not in-
creased, and may even decrease. Thus, the interviewer and field supervisory
costs to recruit a household to keep a diary for two weeks are about $30
at current rates of $2.50 per hour for interviewers. To recruit fifteen
additional households per hundred would cost about $450. The compensation
costs for all 75-80 recruited households per hundred would cost $400 or
less at a rate of $5 per household.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, these results are
based on sparse evidence and much more research is needed on this question.
In particular, very little information exists on the effects of varying
the amount or the frequency of compensation on the two criteria we have
used in this paper, as well as on cost. Research is also needed on the
effect of the time period on these results as well as of the type of
approach and the methods of interviewer training.

-24-
Finally, no work whatsoever seems to have been done to investigate
the effects of compensation in rural areas. We suspect that such effects
will also depend on the educational and income levels of the population,
and will hence be greater in the lower income areas, but on the other
hand these effects may be mitigated by the traditionally better cooper-
ation obtained on almost all types of surveys in rural areas.

References
1. Brookings Institution, The Program of Joint Studies on Latin-American
Economic Integration , Washington, D.C. : 1972.
2. Erdos, Paul L., Professional Mail Surveys , New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1970.
3. Dohrenwend, Barbara S. "An Experimental Study of Payments to Respondents,"
Public Opinion Quarterly 34, Number 4, Winter 1970-1971, pp. 621-24.
4. Ferber, Robert, Collecting Financial Data by Consumer Panel Techniques
,
Urbana: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of
Illinois, 1959.
5. Kemsley, W.F.F. and Nicholson, J.L., "Some Experiments in Methods of
Conducting Consumer Expenditure Surveys," Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society , Series A, 123 , part 3, 1960, pp. 307-328.
6. Lansing, John B., Ginsburg, Gerald P. and Braaten, Kaisa, An Investi-
gation of Response Error , Urbana: Bureau of Economic and Business
Research, University of Illinois, 1961.
7. Sudman, Seymour and Ferber, Robert, "Experiments in Obtaining Consumer
Expenditures by Diary Methods," Journal of the American Statistical
Association 66 , December, 1971, pp. 725-735.
8. Sudman, Seymour and Ferber, Robert, Experiments in Obtaining Consumer
Expenditures of Durable Goods by Recall Procedures
,
Urbana; Survey
Research Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1970.
9. Sudman, Seymour and Ferber, Robert, "A Comparison of Alternative Pro-
cedures for Collecting Consumer Expenditure Data for Frequently Pur-
chased Products," Faculty Working Paper 87, College of Commerce and
Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
1973.
.



